A Controversial
Registration Process
Registration as a Basis for
Rights
Thailand’s Migrant Policy (up through 2004)
Since 1996, the Thai government has grappled with migrant policy on an ad-hoc basis. The policy passed in 2004, although the best policy to date still falls short of unequivocally addressing the reality that migrant labor has become an integral part of Thailand’s socio-economic landscape. The problem is that the policy balances two conflicting agendas. On one hand, the government is ostensibly addressing migrant issues by tacitly acknowledging that migrant workers are a necessary component of the work force, which makes them a part of society and, therefore, deserving of concomitant rights and health. On the other hand, fueled by strong nationalist sentiment, the government is afraid that if social programs are too obliging, migrants will be encouraged to flood into the country, overwhelming already stretched resources and disrupting society. Thus, the government’s policy on migrants falls precariously in-between the two by maintaining a temporary and extremely tenuous place for migrants in Thai society where, although there is acknowledgement of migrants’ rights, the mechanisms in place to actualize these rights are weak or impracticable.
The first regular registration for
migrants in 1996 only allowed migrants to register under certain occupations in
a limited number of provinces. In 2001, the Thaksin administration implemented
a bold policy to register as many migrant workers as they could through a
fast-track registration system that allowed all migrant workers employed at the
time to register. This open policy, dubbed the “Free Migrant Policy,” succeeded
in registering over 562,000 migrant workers. This number became the cap, where
only those who had initially registered could subsequently re-register. To
remain in the system, migrants needed to re-register every six-months. This
resulted in high dropout rates with the following years seeing a steep decline
in the numbers of migrants re-registering: 409,000 in 2002, to 288,000 in 2003.
Due to the declining numbers of migrants
re-registering, the Thaksin administration decided to develop a “Master Plan”
to decisively handle the migrant issue. The governments’ intention for the
“Master Plan” of 2004 was to bring about the following outcomes:
Ø
Register
as many migrants living in the country, including laborers, unemployed migrants
and family members / dependents;
Ø
Include
all registered migrants under the universal health coverage system;
Ø
Maintain
more accurate records on migrants;
Ø
Register
employers of migrants;
Ø
Initiate
steps towards greater regularization of migrants that will eventually lead to a
formalized migration system.
Development of both the “Free
Migrant Policy” and the “Master Plan” of 2004 had considerable input from the
Committee for the Management of Illegal Migrant Workers - a committee composed
of members from various Ministries related to migrant issues. Unfortunately,
the focus of migrant policy coming from this Committee has been primarily
couched in terms of national security. On an encouraging note, the development
process for the “Master Plan” of 2004 also received input from the National
Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRC) - an outside “watchdog” agency that
includes representatives from the legal system (including a justice, lawyers
and attorneys versed in rights cases), NGOs, academics, and a journalist.
Although the NHRC is unable to directly influence policy, it acts as a
conscience for policy makers.
The registration of 2004 was a
progressive step, however, representatives of migrants and related NGOs have
criticized the registration process for not going as far as it could have in
trying to register all migrants currently in Thailand.
One criticism is that the
government kept the window period for the initial phase of registration at one
month (NGOs protested and requested an extension of the initial period, but the
government refused). This brief period, which was prerequisite to entering the
registration system, denied migrants who may not have been present during
registration, such as fishermen at sea, those visiting their home country, or
those who may have entered the country after the registration period, from
being able to enter the registration process.
It was also too brief a period considering that registration was announced only a couple of weeks in advance. The quick announcement of registration caught local government officials responsible for registration unprepared. Many local officials didn’t fully understand the process or the rights granted, and were unable to obtain clarification due to the unilateral chain of communication with the central government. Except for locations where NGOs working with migrants are active, local officials lacked interpreters, translation of forms, or information in migrants’ language explaining the registration process, terms or benefits. There was also very little promotion of registration in migrants’ language, except in a few provinces. The lack of clarity and promotion provided scam artists the opportunity to take advantage of migrants’ uncertainty, resulting in many migrants’ paying unauthorized agents money for fake documents.
The registration process itself
also suffered from controversy. One of the main complications in the first
phase of the process was the registration of migrants’ residence, including
registration by the owner of migrants’ residence. Many locations where migrants
resided were informal residences without addresses that ranged from hovels in
remote areas or on construction sites, to dormitories on factory compounds. In
other cases, owners may have been unwilling to reveal the location of these
residences because of reasons associated with housing undocumented migrants.
Realizing the problems related to relying on landlords to register migrants,
the government relented on this issue, allowing migrants to register themselves
independently over the last ten days of the first phase.
As a backdrop, there were
crackdowns during and preceding registration, supposedly to deter new migrants
from entering the country. During the crackdown, approximately 400 migrants
were arrested and sent back across the border a day, many of who simply
re-entered Thailand as soon as possible. (The Bangkok Post, July 03, 2004).
The crackdown was counter-productive, however, as it instilled a sense of fear
and distrust among migrants already in the country and dissuaded many from
revealing themselves, thus deterring them from registering.
Migrants who wish to obtain a work
permit must undergo a health exam and purchase health insurance. Dependents that
have registered under the general registry are also eligible for health
insurance, but must take the health exam as a prerequisite. The health exam
tests for seven specific diseases deemed of public health concern:
Tuberculosis, Syphilis, Elephantiasis (also known as Filiaraisis), Leprosy,
Malaria, intestinal worms, and addictive drug use / severe alcoholism. HIV is not
one of the conditions tested. As mentioned, 817,254 migrants, around 73 percent
of all migrants that registered, took the health exam. Out of those examined,
82 percent or 672,636 individuals had no health conditions deemed of concern.
The remaining 144,618 migrants were placed under one of two categories: Type
2 - those with serious but treatable conditions, and Type 3 - those
with serious conditions that were deemed grounds for repatriation.
Disease control is the Ministry of
Public Health’s rationale for the health exam. In this function, those who are
found to have Type 2 diseases are put on probation, where they are
treated for the disease and are allowed to obtain a work permit once they have
completed treatment and are given approval by health officials. Those with Type
3 are supposed to be repatriated; however, it has been found that many Thai
doctors have treated these people prior to repatriation, and in some cases,
have even allowed them to enter the Type 2 classification when their
health has improved. One of the weaknesses of the health exam is that the
information generated on health conditions of migrants isn’t used in a proactive
fashion, such as establishing priority disease campaigns for migrants.
The Controversy over Testing for Pregnancy
Of grave concern and on-going controversy is the fact that the Thai government still tests for pregnancy in the health exam. In 2001, pregnancy was deemed an exclusionary condition. After protests, the following year it became non-exclusionary, but the results were given to the employer who could then determine whether or not to terminate her employment, potentially leading to arrest and repatriation if she was fired. The concern is that if pregnancy remains a tested condition, the implication will remain that pregnancy could lead to the loss of the entitlement to work, and this will lead to numerous migrant women attempting to terminate pregnancies using unsafe means in order to keep their jobs and remain in Thailand.
During health exams for the 2004
registration, 9,383 migrant women were found to be pregnant (purportedly 3.5
percent of the women who took the health exam). Even after the previous
controversy and seeming resolution to make pregnancy non-exclusionary, there
was a call by the Committee for the Management of Illegal Migrant Workers to
repatriate these women – a resolution that was vocally opposed by the National
Human Rights Commission, the National Security Council, as well as NGOs.
Although this threat was abandoned, it is worrisome that, considering the
implications, testing for pregnancy is still conducted as part of the health
exam, and that the government made such a statement.
To the Thai government’s credit,
migrant policy in no way explicitly discriminates against migrants’ access to health
or other basic rights. One underlying concern about the policy though, is it
explicitly grants rights only to migrants who enter the registration
system. Undocumented migrants are considered “illegal,” which essentially
precludes them from any inherent rights. (Current estimates put the total
number of migrants living and working in Thailand at close to 2 million,
meaning there is possibly over half a million undocumented migrants in
Thailand.) This delineation results in regular rights violations of
undocumented migrants, including exploitation, regular arrests and deportation.
Many of those who are registered
find that they are unable to fully receive the benefits inherent in
registration. A major constraint is the fact that many employers hold migrants’
registration cards as a form of “insurance,” and give the migrant a photocopy,
which in the eyes of the police and other officials, is insufficient. Those who
have been able to secure possession of their ID, on the other hand, have
expressed greater freedom of mobility due to a reduced fear of arrest or
harassment by officials. Although ID cards were issued in a timely fashion,
official work permits took a very long time to process, and were not printed
until May 2005 - just before the first year’s registration period ended.
Out of the total 1,284,920
migrants, including laborers and dependents that entered the registration
system, 1,191,838 were of working age. Out of that number, only 814,247 had
work permits issued, and 817,254 had the health exam and purchased health
insurance.
Province
|
Total # of Migrants
Entering Registration System (includes dependents) |
Total # of Migrants
Taking Health Exam ** |
Total # of Migrants
Receiving Work Permits |
|
National Total |
1,280,053 |
817,254 |
814,247 |
|
Bangkok |
204,239 |
179,439 |
152,163 |
|
Tak* |
124,618 |
52,184 |
50,961 |
|
Samut Sakhorn |
103,440 |
79,202 |
74,225 |
|
Chiang Mai* |
82,959 |
25,093 |
48,502 |
|
Ranong* |
55,749 |
31,546 |
30,158 |
|
Chonburi |
50,017 |
40,083 |
33,654 |
|
Samut Prakarn |
51,413 |
31,582 |
27,027 |
Source: Office of Administration
Commission on Irregular Immigrant Workers, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare
- as of Dec. 15, 2004
*Border province with
Burma
** Health exam also
indicates those purchasing health insurance
The delineation of “illegal” migrants has also resulted in confusion over the provision of health services. Although generally, public health providers understand that no individual shall be refused provision of health (as part of the Hippocratic oath and as explicitly expressed in the Kingdom of Thailand’s Constitution), there is confusion as to whether undocumented migrants should be refused services if they cannot pay, or if the police should be notified once they have been treated. (PATH, 2004) This is exacerbated by the fact that employers commonly abandon undocumented migrants who require hospitalization at the steps of the hospital.
The most controversial element of
the registration process is the signing of MOUs with the governments of
migrants’ source countries. The MOU is a bilateral agreement meant to lay out
the guidelines for establishment of a formalized system for the recruitment,
hiring, transport and returning of migrant laborers. As of the beginning of
2005, all three countries have signed an MOU with Thailand. Since signing,
however, the military government of Burma has gone through a restructuring that
resulted in a change in the most influential actors, necessitating a review of
the MOU by the new government and delaying its implementation in Burma.
Regardless of potential setbacks (and there are many), it is anticipated by
government figures that the MOUs will play a pivotal role in the eventual
regularization of migration between Thailand and its neighboring countries.
In part, the success of the
“Master Plan” is partially contingent on the implementation of the MOUs, which
is the last phase of the registration process and is to be conducted over the
years 2005-2006. During this period, governments in the countries of migrants’
origin will attempt to verify the citizenship of migrants registered in
Thailand and issue them with travel documents or a passport. In order to do
this, those governments will undergo a process to authenticate that those
migrants who have registered in Thailand are officially citizens of their
country, which will necessitate the sending of personal information of migrants
back to their home country. This is where the contention arises.
Even though the IOM will
purportedly provide policy recommendations on the implementation of this policy
in Cambodia and Lao PDR, many advocates for migrants have expressed human
rights concerns related to this phase of the process. In Lao PDR for example,
emigration involves registering as a migrant, which is often avoided for fear
of having to pay an excessive tax to local officials. Revealing people who have
illegally emigrated may potentially be detrimental to families of migrants,
unfairly burdening them with fines that may be levied by local officials.
Concerns about officially recording migrants who have left Burma are even
stronger. Many migrants from Burma may have political as well as economic
reasons for emigrating, and thus, revealing personal information about them to
the military government may seriously jeopardize their families’ security, and
put them in danger.
There are also lingering questions
regarding what happens if the verification process fails. (As of March 2005,
Lao PDR had verified the nationality of 1,300 of migrants acknowledged as Lao
Nationals, or approximately 1.25 percent of migrants registered as being from
Lao PDR.) A lingering question that hangs over this process is, “what will
happen to migrants who have already registered, but are not confirmed as
citizens of their country of origin?” The insinuation is that their status will
change from being documented migrants to ‘stateless people.’
For more information on registration
results from 2004 go to Vulnerability
of Migrants, and to download the MOU go to the home page